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STATE DEBT
N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 11:
[Nyo debt shall be hereafter contracted by or in behalf of the
state unless such debt shall be authorized by law .... No such
law shall take effect until it shall, at a general election, have
been submitted to the people, and have received a majority of all
votes cast for and against it at such election ....
COURT OF APPEALS
Schulz v. State of New York3 146
(decided May 11, 1993)
A group of voters claimed their rights under the New York
State Constitution3 147 were violated when they were denied
standing to challenge, in separate lawsuits, two state financing
schemes incurring state debt.3 148 The voters alleged that these
schemes had taken effect before appellants were provided with an
opportunity to exercise their right to vote on the desirability of
the debt-incurring legislation.3 149 The New York Court of
Appeals held that voter standing should be recognized in the suit
3146. 81 N.Y.2d 336, 615 N.E.2d 953, 599 N.Y.S.2d 469 (1993).
3147. See N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 11 which provides in pertinent part:
[N]o debt shall be hereafter contracted by or in behalf of the state unless
such debt shall be authorized by law .... No such law shall take effect
until it shall, at a general election, have been submitted to the people,
and have received a majority of all votes cast for and against it at such
election ....
Id.
3148. Schulz, 81 N.Y.2d at 342, 615 N.E.2d at 954, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 470.
3149. Id. at 345, 615 N.E.2d at 955, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 471. This right to vote
on the desirability of debt-incurring legislation was provided for in the New
York State Constitution due to the skeptical view of public indebtedness shared
by the people of New York. Id. at 346, 615 N.E.2d at 956, 599 N.Y.S.2d at
472. The people feared their elected representatives would be tempted to
borrow against the future by using long-term debt to finance day to day
operating expenses of the government. Id. Therefore, article VII, § 11 of the
New York State Constitution was enacted as a check against the government
contracting public debt. Id.
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involving the first financing scheme (Schulz Appeal #1) as "the
express voter referendum requirement to incur debt contained in
article VII, section 11 is inextricably linked to the constitutional
grant of debt- incurring authority." 3150 In the suit brought
against the second financing scheme (Schulz Appeal #2), the
court dismissed the appeal as the plaintiffs failed to allege voter
standing in the prior proceeding. 3 15 1 While the court addressed
the issue of standing in Schulz Appeal #1, the constitutional
merits of the appellants' fiscal challenges were not addressed "on
the sole ground that the commencement of the legislation [did]
rdot satisfy the equitable laches doctrine ... "3152
Schulz Appeal #1 involved Chapter 190 of the State Laws of
19903153 which provided for the sale and leaseback of the Attica
Correctional Facility and Interstate Highway 287 by the state to a
state-created public corporation. 3 154 These purchases were
financed by bond issues of the UDC,3 155 thus creating the state
debt which appellants challenged. 3 156  Schulz Appeal #2
3150. Id. at 345, 615 N.E.2d at 955, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 471. The defendant
state argued, to no avail, that "article VII § 11 did not allow for separate
standing [for taxpayers) to sue." Id. at 347, 615 N.E.2d at 956, 599 N.Y.S.2d
at 472. The state premised its argument on Wein v. Comptroller of State of
New York, 46 N.Y.2d 394, 386 N.E.2d 242, 413 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1979)
(refusing to accord taxpayer standing in challenge to issuance of state bond
anticipation notes) and New York State Coalition for Criminal Justice v.
Loughlin, 64 N.Y.2d 660, 474 N.E.2d 607, 485 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1984)
(denying taxpayers standing to challenge issuance of bonds by the New York
Urban Development Corporation [hereinafter "UDC"]). The Schulz court
responded to this argument by stating that although such cases did "bar
'taxpayer' standing to challenge the issuance of bonds.., they should not be
followed, at least with respect to voter standing to sue on financing schemes
subject to voter referendum approval." 81 N.Y.2d at 317, 615 N.E.2d at 956,
599 N.Y.S.2d at 472.
3151. Id. at 344, 615 N.E.2d at 955, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 471.
3152. Id. at 350, 615 N.E.2d at 958, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 474.
3153. 1990 N.Y. Laws 190.
3154. Schulz, 81 N.Y.2d at 344, 615 N.E.2d at 955, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 471.
3155. The UDC is a non-profit organization created by the New York State
Legislature to address urban decay through urban renewal projects. See N.Y.
UNCONSOL. LAW §§ 6251-58 (McKinney 1979).
3156. Schulz, 81 N.Y.2d at 344, 615 N.E.2d at 955, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 471.
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STATE DEBT
concerned Chapter 220 of the laws of 19903157 which called for
the creation of the New York Local Government Assistance
Corporation, a body authorized to issue 4.7 billion dollars in
bond obligations, payable from state taxes. 3 158
As neither statutory provision was submitted for approval in a
voter referendum, appellants challenged the constitutionality of
the legislation under article VII, section 11, of the New York
State Constitution. 315 9 Until 1976, standing was recognized only
for one personally aggrieved by a state statute and only if that
grievance implicated a determination of constitutionality. 3 160
These prerequisites to standing were lessened when the court of
appeals chose to recognize "the failure to accord such standing
would be in effect to erect an impenetrable barrier to any judicial
scrutiny of legislative action." 3 16 1 Consequently, in the case at
hand, the court stated that withholding standing to voters "denied
access to the voting booth in alleged violation of an express
referendum right conferred by the New York Constitution"
would erect such an impenetrable barrier. 3 162 It was this concern
which lead the court to recognize standing in Schulz Appeal #1.
The determination of standing in Schulz Appeal #1, however,
was not followed by a determination of the constitutionality of
the legislation in question, as the court's application of the
3157. 1990 N.Y. Laws 220.
3158. Schulz, 81 N.Y.2d at 351, 615 N.E.2d at 959, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 475
(Smith, J., dissenting).
3159. Id. at 344, 615 N.E.2d at 955, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 471.
3160. See St. Clair v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., 13 N.Y.2d 72, 76, 192
N.E.2d 15, 15-16, 242 N.Y.S.2d 43, 44 (1963) (stating that constitutionality of
state statute may be challenged only by one personally effected), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 970 (1964).
3161. 81 N.Y.2d at 345, 615 N.E.2d at 955, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 471 (quoting
Boryszewski v. Brydges, 37 N.Y.2d 361, 364, 334 N.E.2d 579, 581 372
N.Y.S.2d 623, 626 (1975)). The court of appeals in Borysewski departed from
the holding in St. Clair and allowed taxpayers standing to bring Constitutional
challenges against enactments of the state legislature where challenges would
be unlikely from any other source. Id. at 362, 334 N.E.2d at 956, 371
N.Y.S.2d at 624.
3162. Schulz, 81 N.Y.2d at 345, 615 N.E.2d at 955, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 471.
1994] 1325
3
et al.: State Debt
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020
TOURO LAW REVIEW
equitable doctrine of laches proved fatal to the litigation. 3163
Stated simply, the court found that the events which transpired
between the signing of the law and the commencement of the
litigation had progressed too far to be undone. 3164 Given this
inability to satisfy the equitable doctrine of laches, the court
affirmed the ruling of the lower court dismissing the entire
proceeding. 3165
The conclusions of the court were met with a vigorous dissent
which agreed with the court in according plaintiffs standing in
Schulz Appeal #1, but which disagreed with the dismissal of
Schulz Appeal #2 and the barring of both suits under the
equitable doctrine of laches.3166 Judge Smith dissented and
argued with respect to Schulz Appeal #2 that, although no
express allegation of voter standing appeared in the pleadings,
defendants clearly understood that voter standing was being
alleged. 3167 Therefore, Schulz Appeal #2 should not have been
dismissed for lack of voter standing. 3168
In addressing the threshold issue concerning the doctrine of
laches, Judge Smith felt the court erred in erecting the doctrine as
a bar to suit, as both appeals involved alleged constitutional
violations which were "continuing in nature because of their
long-term fiscal impact and continuing authority under the
3163. Id. at 347, 615 N.E.2d at 957, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 473; see In Re
Barabash, 31 N.Y.2d 76, 81, 286 N.E.2d 268, 271, 334 N.Y.S.2d 890, 894
(1972) (stating that the "essential element of this equitable defense is delay
prejudicial to the opposing party").
3164. Schulz, 81 N.Y.2d at 348, 615 N.E.2d at 957, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 473.
During this time, bonds were issued and sold for $377,326,674, Attica and
Highway 287 had been sold and $220 million in proceeds had been deposited
in the capital projects and general fund. Id.
3165. Id. at 343, 615 N.E.2d at 954, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 470.
3166. Id. at 351, 615 N.E.2d at 959, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 475 (Smith, J.,
dissenting).
3167. Id. at 354, 615 N.E.2d at 961, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 477 (Smith, J.,
dissenting). The amended complaint of February 10, 1992 read "plaintiffs
Schultz, Salvador and Boehm each alleged that he was 'a registered voter
registered to vote .... '" Id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
3168. Id. at 354-55, 615 N.E.2d at 961, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 477 (Smith, J.,
dissenting).
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challenged legislation." 3 169 Succinctly put, the incurring of debt
before the suit should not bar a determination on the merits as the
authority to incur additional debt remained. 3 170
In conclusion, the court held that voter standing will be
recognized when a voting right is constitutionally mandated and
when failure to recognize that right would result in the placement
of "'an impenetrable barrier to any judicial scrutiny of legislative
action[s]."' 3171 The dissent by Judge Smith does not cloud this
holding of the court.
3169. Id. at 351, 615 N.E.2d at 959, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 475 (Smith, J.
dissenting).
3170. Id. at 353, 615 N.E.2d at 960, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 476 (Smith, J.,
dissenting).
3171. Id. at 345, 615 N.E.2d at 955, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 471 (quoting
Boryszewski v. Brydges, 37 N.Y.2d 361, 364, 334 N.E.2d 579, 581, 372
N.Y.S.2d 623, 626 (1975)).
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